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Abstract
This paper experimentally explores the eﬃciency of the Groves mechanism and
a proﬁt sharing scheme in a corporate budgeting context. It further examines
the eﬀects of anonymous communication on both incentive schemes. The results
show that although the Groves mechanism is theoretically superior to the proﬁt
sharing scheme, the latter turns out to be advantageous for headquarters in our
experimental setting. This is essentially due to the eﬀects of communication on
both incentive schemes. Under the proﬁt sharing scheme it improves coordination
and reduces ineﬃcient resource allocation. Under the Groves mechanism how-
ever, it leads to stable collusion strategies of the participants and thus increases
compensation costs.
1 Introduction
Traditional budgeting mechanisms provide incentives for subordinate managers to mis-
represent their productivity and to build slack into budgets (e.g. Jensen (2003)). To
avoid such misrepresentations, analytical research has proposed a number of truth in-
ducing compensation schemes (e.g. Weitzman (1976), Reichelstein and Osband (1984),
Osband and Reichelstein (1985)). Among these schemes, particularly the one developed
by Vickrey (1964), Clarke (1971) and Groves (1973), the so-called Groves mechanism,
and its incentive properties have generated substantial interest among researchers.1
Under this mechanism, a manager’s compensation depends on his own division’s ac-
tual proﬁt and the reported proﬁts of all other divisions, and analytical research has
shown that this is generally truth inducing. Despite its theoretically desirable proper-
ties, however, the Groves mechanism is not observed in compensation practice.
Analytical studies have particularly criticized two characteristics of the Groves
mechanism: First, division managers can beneﬁt by coordinating their messages and
manipulating their reported proﬁts upwards (Loeb and Magat (1978), Banker and
Datar (1992)). Second, using the Groves mechanism is not optimal if a hidden action
problem is added to the hidden information problem (Kanodia (1993), Hofmann and
Pfeiﬀer (2003)).2
The experimental study presented in this paper analyzes the ﬁrst of these two
points. Indeed, it can be shown that under certain speciﬁcations of the general class of
control mechanisms deﬁned in Groves and Loeb (1979) division managers can beneﬁt
by coordinating their reports and manipulating their reported productivities upwards.3
However, if all division managers are individually rational, this strategy does not rep-
resent an equilibrium in the budget game because given the other managers’ reports
it is optimal for every manager to report truthfully (Loeb and Magat (1978), Budde,
Go¨x and Luhmer (1998)).
We will not address the second of the points above in this paper as the experimental
ﬁndings on the ﬁrst point, i.e. whether the Groves mechanism induces truth telling or
1See e.g. Green and Laﬀont (1977), Loeb and Magat (1978), Holmstro¨m (1979), Cohen and Loeb
(1984). Groves (1976) and Groves and Loeb (1979) adapted this mechanism to budgeting processes
in divisionalized ﬁrms.
2See also Banker and Datar (1992) for the potential nonoptimality of the Groves mechanism with
precontract private information.
3One of these speciﬁcations is usually used in experimental studies of the Groves mechanism. Note
however, that one can easily ﬁnd speciﬁcations for which managers could beneﬁt by coordinating their
reports and understating their proﬁt functions.
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provides incentives to collude in reality, are so far inconclusive. Thus, it is still unclear
whether this mechanism achieves its basic task of inducing truthful reports at all.
The number of experimental studies on the Groves mechanism is surprisingly small.
However, existing studies show that (i) the Groves mechanism generally does not lead
to truthful reporting behavior, but that (ii) these deviations from truth telling cannot
be traced back to collusive behavior of the participants (Waller and Bishop (1990),
Chow, Hirst and Shields (1994), Chow, Hwang and Liao (2000)). Moreover, when
compared to other (truth inducing) compensation schemes the Groves mechanism turns
out to be superior in most cases: Waller and Bishop (1990) ﬁnd that the Groves
mechanism is more eﬀective in inducing truthful reporting behavior than a division
proﬁt scheme. The results of Chow, Hirst and Shields (1994) show more truthful reports
under the Groves mechanism than under a division proﬁt scheme and a Weitzman
scheme. Finally, Chow, Hwang and Liao (2000) ﬁnd that both the frequency and
the amount of misrepresentation are lower under the Groves mechanism than under
an Osband-Reichelstein scheme, but larger than under a division proﬁt scheme with
resource allocation and audits from a third player.
These experimental results seem surprising at a ﬁrst glance as they still support an
incentive mechanism not observed in practice. However, none of the mechanisms tested
against the Groves mechanism is designed for a resource allocation context where mul-
tiple divisions in a ﬁrm compete for the same resources. Analytically, it can be shown
that these mechanisms do not provide incentives for truth telling in such situations
(Loeb and Magat (1978), Waller (1994)). In contrast, this paper compares the Groves
mechanism to a proﬁt sharing scheme that links the manager’s compensation to overall
ﬁrm proﬁt. As for the Groves mechanism, truthful reporting behavior indeed repre-
sents an equilibrium for the players under this incentive scheme. However, while truth
telling is the unique dominant strategy equilibrium under the Groves mechanism, it
forms a Nash equilibrium under proﬁt sharing but this equilibrium may not be unique
(Loeb and Magat (1978)). Yet, the fact that truth telling is not the unique equilibrium
under proﬁt sharing does not pose a problem from headquarters’ perspective unless
the existence of multiple equilibria leads to ineﬃcient resource allocation due to co-
ordination failures. This paper explores how the theoretical diﬀerences between these
two incentive schemes translate into real behavior.
Moreover, this paper analyzes the eﬀects of cheap talk on both incentive mechanisms
in order to be closer to corporate reality with its various communication possibilities
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than the complete anonymity conditions usually characteristic for experimental eco-
nomics. Cheap talk is implemented by giving the participants in some treatments the
possibility of anonymous preplay communication. As in reality, the participants in our
experiment could not make binding agreements during the communication.
Prior experiments have shown that communication can have substantial eﬀects on
experimental outcome even if it should be irrelevant from a theoretical perspective.
Basically, there are two main eﬀects of communication: First, in social dilemma exper-
iments, decreasing social distance between participants via communication increases
cooperation.4 Second, in coordination problems communication helps to overcome
coordination failures and usually increases equilibrium play (e.g. Cooper, DeJong,
Forsythe and Ross (1989, 1994)).5 In these model structures, cheap talk can already
matter from a theoretical perspective (e.g. Farrell (1987), Farrell and Rabin (1996)).
Thus, the eﬀects of communication on both incentive schemes could be quite diﬀerent:
With respect to proﬁt sharing, communication can improve the coordination of the
managers, and this is beneﬁcial from headquarters’ perspective. In contrast, with re-
gard to the Groves mechanism, the communication possibility should not matter from
a standard theoretical perspective, but prior experimental evidence suggests that it
could matter from an empirical point of view as it raises cooperation. This would be
detrimental for headquarters as it implies larger compensation costs.
Finally, we also conducted a Groves treatment with communication and a positive
auditing probability in every round to account for the possibility of internal audits
in reality and to reduce the probability that deviations from truth telling are due to
incomplete understanding of the dominant strategy. Prior experiments have shown
that probabilistic audits are eﬀective in inducing truthful reporting behavior (Chow,
Hirst and Shields (1995), Chow, Hwang and Liao (2000)).
Our principal ﬁndings are: Consistent with results of prior experimental studies
we ﬁnd that all Groves treatments lead to signiﬁcant deviations from truthful report-
ing behavior. However, while the misrepresentation of productivities in the treat-
ment without communication can be traced back to either incomplete understanding
4For the eﬀects of communication on social dilemma situations see e.g. Dawes, McTavish and
Shaklee (1977), Isaac, McCue and Plott (1985), Isaac and Walker (1988), Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliland
(1994). See also Sally (1995) for a meta-analysis of social dilemma experiments and the eﬀects of
communication. Social distance can be also decreased by identifying game partners via photos or
direct face-to-face encounters without communication, see e.g. Fox and Guyer (1978), Bohnet and
Frey (1999a,b), Andreoni and Petrie (2004).
5However, communication generally does not lead to full eﬃciency.
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of the Groves mechanism or social preferences, misrepresentation in the treatment with
communication is due to coordinated collusive behavior of the participants. Average
misrepresentation in the communication treatment more than triples relative to the
noncommunication treatment. Moreover, the deviations from truth telling in the com-
munication treatment increase during the ﬁrst rounds and remain stable during the
rest of the game. We do not observe any end-game eﬀect. Thus, communication leads
to stable collusion strategies of the participants in our experimental setting. Adding a
positive auditing probability to the communication treatment conditions reduces aver-
age misrepresentation to a level slightly above that in the noncommunication treatment
and increases the frequency of truthful reports. However, the positive auditing proba-
bility does not eliminate the stability of the participants’ collusion strategies. Again,
we do not observe any end-game eﬀect. In contrast, both proﬁt sharing treatments lead
to signiﬁcantly lower deviations from truth telling than every Groves treatment. In the
treatment without communication however, coordination failures are very likely to oc-
cur. In only 30% of the cases an equilibrium is hit by the participants. As predicted,
the communication possibility strongly increases equilibrium play by the participants
to 75% of the cases. Finally, when we examine the eﬀects of misrepresentation and
coordination failures on headquarters’ net earnings, we ﬁnd that earnings are larger in
both proﬁt sharing treatments than in all Groves treatments.
Thus, although the Groves mechanism is superior from a theoretical perspective,
the proﬁt sharing scheme turns out to be superior in our experimental setting. This
is essentially due to the eﬀects of the communication possibility on both incentive
schemes: While improved coordination under the proﬁt sharing scheme is beneﬁcial
for headquarters, the participants’ stable collusion strategies in the Groves treatments
lead to ineﬃcient resource allocation and particularly to larger compensation costs. We
argue that with respect to corporate reality with its various communication possibilities
our results contribute to explain why the Groves mechanism is not used as an incentive
scheme in budgeting processes in reality. While it is collusion proof from a theoretical
perspective, it is not when implemented in practice.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 brieﬂy presents
the model which was implemented in the experiment in a discrete version. Section
3 describes the experimental design and derives the hypotheses. The experimental
results are presented in section 4, and section 5 concludes.
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2 The model
In a ﬁnitely repeated game headquarters of a decentralized ﬁrm has to allocate x¯ units
of a scarce resource among two divisions.6 Division i’s proﬁt function π˜i(xi) is given
by:
π˜i(xi) = (p
0
i −
1
2
bxi) · xi − xi + ε˜i for i = 1, 2 with b > 0 (1)
where xi is the number of resource units allocated to division i and ε˜i is a division
speciﬁc noise term with mean 0. Noise terms are uncorrelated across divisions and are
distributed such that the divisions’ productivity parameters p0i cannot be inferred from
the realization of π˜i(xi).
We further assume that there are diﬀerent levels of information asymmetry in the
ﬁrm and that headquarters generally has inferior information about the divisions’ pro-
ductivities. In the model, this is reﬂected by the assumption that b is common knowl-
edge and identical for both divisions and in all periods, but the divisions’ productivity
parameters p0i are uncertain for both headquarters and the division managers before
every period starts. However, it is known to the division managers ex ante that for
both divisions p0i is a random variable on the interval [p
0
min, p
0
max]. At the beginning of
each period every division manager learns the realization of his division’s productivity
parameter for this period. The realization is independent of previous realizations and
independent of the other division’s parameter. With respect to headquarters’ informa-
tion we assume that there already exists a potential information asymmetry between
headquarters and division managers ex ante. That means, not only does headquarters
not know the actual productivity parameters of the current period but headquarters
also has inferior information about the potential values of the productivity parameters.7
More precisely, from headquarters’ perspective the divisions’ productivity parameters
are random variables on the interval [p0min − ∆, p0max + ∆] where p0min − ∆ − bx¯ ≥ 1
and p0min − ∆ > p0max + ∆ − bx¯. The ﬁrst constraint reﬂects the fact that although
6In the experiment, participants played ten rounds of this game. However, this is irrelevant for the
(standard) theoretical solution as the multiperiod case is solved by backward induction. Therefore,
we will only analyze the one shot game in the following.
7This assumption can be justiﬁed if operating executives have superior knowledge about the pro-
ductivities of other operational units compared to central accounting or ﬁnancing departments. Tech-
nically, this assumption is necessary to induce multiple pareto eﬃcient Nash equilibria in the proﬁt
sharing treatments. With ∆ = 0 the only pareto eﬃcient equilibrium in pure strategies would be
truth telling. This ex ante information asymmetry thus prevents participants’ focussing on this equi-
librium during the experiment. For pareto eﬃciency as a natural focal point see e.g. Schelling (1966),
Appendix C, Harsanyi and Selten (1988), chap. 3, also Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe and Ross (1990)
and VanHuyck, Battalio and Beil (1990) for experimental results.
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marginal revenue decreases linearly in xi, every division could productively employ all
available resource units. The second constraint however implies that it is never optimal
to allocate all resource units to only one of the two divisions. Thus, in order to opti-
mally allocate the resource units among the two divisions headquarters needs truthful
information from the division managers about p0i .
After the managers’ reports headquarters allocates the resource units among the
two divisions. Therefore, it solves
Max
xˆi,xˆj
E(π˜) = E(π˜i) + E(π˜j) = (pˆ
0
i − 1)xˆi −
1
2
bxˆ2i + (pˆ
0
j − 1)xˆj −
1
2
bxˆ2j (2)
s.t. xˆi + xˆj = x¯
where pˆ0i and pˆ
0
j represent the reported productivity parameters and x̂i and x̂j are the
resource units allocated to the two divisions upon their reports. Thus, headquarters’
decision rule is the maximization of reported ﬁrm proﬁt. This maximizes actual ﬁrm
proﬁt if truth telling is optimal for the division managers given this allocation scheme.
Solving (2) yields:
xˆi =
pˆ0i − pˆ0j + bx¯
2b
(3a)
and
xˆj =
pˆ0j − pˆ0i + bx¯
2b
(3b)
Every manager maximizes his expected utility in this model if he maximizes the
expected value of his compensation. Let αi be manager i’s share in his performance
measure and let αi be identical for both managers. Assume ﬁrst that the managers
are compensated via a proﬁt sharing scheme, i.e. both managers receive a share of the
actual ﬁrm proﬁt. Then, a manager’s expected compensation E(c˜i) – given the value
of p0i for the current period – takes on the following form:
E(c˜i) = αi ·
∫
p0j
[
(p0i − 1)xˆi −
1
2
bxˆ2i + (p
0
j − 1)xˆj −
1
2
bxˆ2j
]
f(p0j)dp
0
j (4)
where f(p0j) is the density function over p
0
j . Substituting (3) into (4) and diﬀerentiating
yields the ﬁrst order condition for the optimal reporting strategy:
∂E(c˜i)
∂pˆ0i
= p0i − pˆ0i +
∫
p0j
δj(p
0
j)f(p
0
j)dp
0
j = 0
⇔ pˆ0i − p0i =
∫
p0j
δj(p
0
j)f(p
0
j)dp
0
j = E
[
δj(p
0
j)
]
(5)
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where δj(p
0
j) = pˆ
0
j − p0j .8 Thus, it is optimal for manager i to adjust his report by
the expected deviation of manager j from his actual productivity parameter.9 If we
substitute (5) into manager j’s ﬁrst order condition we obtain for the optimal reporting
strategy of both managers:
pˆ0i − p0i = δ = pˆ0j − p0j (6)
Thus, every reporting strategy that satisﬁes δi = δj = δ constitutes a Nash equi-
librium. First, this is the case for truthful reporting behavior, i.e. δ = 0, but not
exclusively. Due to the ex ante information asymmetry both division managers know
that p0i ∈ [p0min, p0max] whereas from headquarters’ perspective p0i ∈ [p0min −∆, p0max + ∆].
Consequently, both manager can always over- or understate their productivity para-
meters by at least ∆, and reporting strategies where 0 < |δ| ≤ ∆ for all realizations
of p0i and p
0
j also form pure strategy Nash equilibria. Moreover, these equilibria are
all pareto eﬃcient as manager i’s biased report is just compensated by manager j’s
deviation and the same (eﬃcient) resource allocation as in the truth telling case is
obtained.
In contrast, reporting diﬀerent δi(p
0
i ) for diﬀerent realizations of p
0
i is not an equi-
librium strategy as the best “response” of manager j is a constant deviation equal to
E [δi(p
0
i )]. But in this case it is again optimal for manager i to choose a deviation of
the same magnitude for all p0i . Similarly, it can be shown that reporting strategies with
E [δi(p
0
i )] > ∆ cannot be part of an equilibrium, either.
10
From headquarters’ perspective, the existence of multiple equilibria does not pose a
problem as long as the resource allocation is always eﬃcient, i.e. if always δi = δj. Yet,
this is exactly the diﬃculty if none of the multiple equilibria emerges as a “focal” point
to the players.11 The equilibrium selection problem in this case is essentially unsolved
by analytical theory. Moreover, as described above, pareto eﬃciency cannot serve as
a selection criterium in this game. Consequently, ineﬃciencies in the proﬁt sharing
scheme may arise from ineﬃcient resource allocation due to potential coordination
failures, but not from the deviations from truth telling themselves.12
8δj depends on p0j as it is generally possible to have diﬀerent δj for diﬀerent p
0
j .
9See also Loeb and Magat (1978) and Jennergren (1980) to this point.
10Also, there is no mixed strategy equilibrium in this model if we consider a mixed strategy of both
managers over 2n + 1 equal steps between δi = −∆ and δi = ∆. Therefore, and due to the fact that
there has been expressed serious doubts about the implementation of mixed strategies in experiments,
see e.g. Brown and Rosenthal (1990), we will concentrate on pure strategies in the following.
11See e.g. Schelling (1966), Ochs (1995), Camerer (2003), chap. 7.
12However, see Cohen and Loeb (1984) for potential problems of the proﬁt sharing scheme when an
7
In contrast to the proﬁt sharing scheme, truth telling always represents the dom-
inant strategy equilibrium under the Groves mechanism. Under the speciﬁcation of
the Groves mechanism implemented in the experiment a manager’s compensation is an
increasing function of his own division’s actual proﬁt and the other division’s reported
proﬁt. The reported proﬁt is calculated based upon the reported productivity para-
meter and the resource units allocated due to this report. Thus, manager i’s expected
compensation is given by
E(c˜i) = αi · [E(π˜i) + πˆj] = αi ·
∫
p0j
[
(p0i − 1)xˆi −
1
2
bxˆ2i + (pˆ
0
j − 1)xˆj −
1
2
bxˆ2j
]
f(p0j)dp
0
j
(7)
where πˆj is the reported proﬁt of division j calculated upon pˆ
0
j and xˆj.
13 Substituting
(3) into (7) and optimizing the managers’ reports yields:
pˆ0i = p
0
i (8a)
and
pˆ0j = p
0
j (8b)
Thus, it is always optimal in the Groves mechanism to report truthfully, independent
of the other manager’s report. As this avoids ineﬃciencies due to coordination failures,
the Groves mechanism is the theoretically superior budgeting instrument. Although
managers can beneﬁt by coordinating their reports and manipulating their reported
productivity parameters upwards this does not form an equilibrium in a ﬁnitely re-
peated game under standard theoretical assumptions.14
We will now examine the eﬀects of cheap talk on the theoretical results of our
model. In general, unrestricted communication – as implemented in our experiment –
can lead to a multitude of possible messages and thus to a multitude of new equilibria.
Therefore, in the following we will particularly concentrate on communication strategies
and messages which will be relevant for the experimental analysis.
eﬀort variable is introduced.
13Note that the general class of performance indicators derived in Groves (1976) and Groves and
Loeb (1979) takes on the following form for manager i in this context: φi(p0j )·(π˜i+πˆj)+ψi(p0j ). φi(p0j )
is a strictly positive function that depends only on division j’s message, and ψi(p0j ) is an arbitrary
function that depends only on division j’s message. Thus, we set φi(p0j ) = 1 and ψi(p
0
j ) = 0 in our
experiment as in all other experimental studies of the Groves mechanism.
14See Loeb and Magat (1978). However, Kunz and Pfeiﬀer (1999) in an extension of Kreps, Milgrom,
Roberts and Wilson (1982) show that the Groves mechanism can lead to rational cooperation if there
is a positive probability for tit-for-tat players among the division managers.
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Although the communication implemented in the experiment represents cheap talk
in a game theoretical sense and thus is non-binding, it can play an important role for
the coordination of players between diﬀerent equilibria.15 From a standard theoretical
point of view cheap talk can matter if the players’ announcements are self-committing
and self-signalling: If a player’s message is believed it creates incentives to fulﬁll it
(self-committing) and a player has an incentive to send a message if and only if it is
true (self-signalling) (Farrell and Rabin (1996)). This is indeed the case for the proﬁt
sharing scheme: If manager i communicates his δi during the communication phase
he has an incentive to report this δi to headquarters as manager j has an incentive to
choose his δj correspondingly.
16
If communication is two-sided and unrestricted as it was in the experiment, the num-
ber of pareto eﬃcient reporting strategies can increase even further compared to the
case without communication. This is the case if players truthfully communicate their
actual productivity parameters to their partners during the communication phase.17
Then, additional pareto eﬃcient equilibria emerge except for the case that we simul-
taneously have p0i = p
0
min and p
0
j = p
0
max. This is due to the fact that the managers are
now able to deviate from the truthful reports by more than ∆ without changing the
(eﬃcient) resource allocation. For example, if both productivity parameters are iden-
tical every reporting strategy with pˆ0i = pˆ
0
j and pˆ
0
i ∈ [p0min −∆, p0max + ∆] represents a
Nash equilibrium.
Again it cannot be determined from a theoretical perspective which of the multiple
equilibria will be chosen if none of the equilibria is “focal” for the players. Thus,
in the communication case we might observe deviations from truth telling even more
frequently than in the case without communication. However, as we have demonstrated
above, the robustness of the proﬁt sharing scheme is that all of these equilibria lead to
eﬃcient resource allocation. Therefore, despite a possibly lower frequency of truthful
reports, communication is beneﬁcial for headquarters under the proﬁt sharing scheme
due to improved coordination.
15See e.g. Farrell (1987, 1993) for a theoretical perspective, Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross
(1989, 1994) for experimental results.
16From a theoretical perspective, one-sided communication would be suﬃcient in this game to reach
coordination between the two managers.
17Truthful communication of the actual productivities represents an equilibrium. Theoretically,
there would also be an equilibrium if manager i communicated his actual productivity truthfully but
manager j did not as long as manager j re-adjusts his report to headquarters. However, as this case
is empirically not relevant it will not be considered in the following.
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If, in contrast, managers are compensated according to the Groves mechanism com-
munication is irrelevant from a standard theoretical perspective. The message of an
overstatement of the productivity parameter during the communication is neither self-
signalling nor self-committing and therefore does not aﬀect managers’ reports. Thus,
proﬁt sharing can at best be equivalent to the Groves mechanism from a theoretical
perspective as both compensation schemes should lead to full eﬃciency under commu-
nication.
Yet, these standard theoretical predictions of the eﬀects of communication on the
Groves mechanism are in stark contrast to experimental ﬁndings. These ﬁndings show
that decreasing social distance between experiment participants via communication in-
creases cooperation between them even if communication is irrelevant from a theoretical
point of view. Therefore, the eﬀects of communication on both compensation schemes
in reality are likely to diﬀer more strongly than the standard theoretical predictions.
With respect to the proﬁt sharing scheme it should enable better coordination of the
managers and decrease ineﬃcient resource allocations due to coordination failures. In
contrast, under the Groves mechanism communication could lead to increased coopera-
tion despite its theoretical irrelevance and thus cause increased compensation costs for
the ﬁrm. With respect to the real eﬀects of communication it seems to be particularly
beneﬁcial for the proﬁt sharing scheme that there is no collusion possibility for the
division managers and the maximum compensation (not the optimum in terms of an
equilibrium) is reached if headquarters reaches its maximum, too.
3 Experimental design and hypotheses
The experimental analysis consists of ﬁve diﬀerent treatments: Groves mechanism with
and without communication, Groves mechanism with communication and audits and
proﬁt sharing with and without communication.18 All experimental sessions had two
parts: the training and the payoﬀ rounds. Before the 10 payoﬀ rounds started the
participants completed 12 training rounds to learn how their compensation scheme
18In fact, the experimental data presented here were gathered in two studies. In the ﬁrst study, we
implemented the Groves treatments with and without communication, in the second study we per-
formed the Groves treatment with communication and audits as well as the proﬁt sharing treatments
with and without communication. However, as we had diﬀerent participants in these two studies and
did neither change the instructions nor the procedure (except for the adjustments necessary to account
for the special characteristics of every treatment) there is no relevant diﬀerence between these two
studies and thus we will not diﬀerentiate between them in the following.
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worked. During these training rounds the participants had no real partner, but a
computer simulated the decisions of the other player. The points earned during the
training rounds had no eﬀect on participants’ income from the experiment. After
having completed the training every participant was assigned a partner for all following
10 payoﬀ rounds. The partner’s identity was never revealed. This was all known to
the participants.
In the experiment, we implemented a discrete version of the model analyzed in
section 2. More precisely, the divisions’ proﬁt function πi(xi) was given by:
πi(xi) =
⎧⎨
⎩
p0i · xi − xi = (p0i − 1) · xi for xi ≤ 40
40 · p0i + (xi − 40) · (p0i − 0.3)− xi for 40 < xi ≤ 100
40 · p0i + 60 · (p0i − 0.3) + (xi − 100)− xi for 100 < xi
∀ i = 1, 2 (9)
with p0i ∈ {1.4, 1.5, ..., 2.1}. Thus, marginal revenue is again decreasing in xi: For
xi ≤ 40 it amounts to p0i , for 40 < xi ≤ 100 to p0i − 0.3, and for all xi > 100 it
is equal to 1. The general shape of the divisions’ proﬁt function according to (9)
was common knowledge but the divisions’ productivity parameters p0i were uncertain.
At the beginning of every round the values of p0i for both divisions were randomly
determined and every division manager was informed about his exact productivity
parameter in the current round. We did not include a random variable ε˜i into the
proﬁt function to avoid any distortions. However, the participants were informed that
(except for the case of an audit in the corresponding Groves treatment) headquarters
would never know their actual productivity parameter of a given round. Therefore, the
only consequences of a misrepresentation of the productivity parameters were potential
changes in the compensation.
Based upon the reported productivity parameters pˆ0i and pˆ
0
j headquarters allocated
x¯ = 120 resource units among the two divisions. For pˆ0i ≤ pˆ0j the allocation was as
follows:
xi = 20 and xj = 100 ∀ pˆ0i < pˆ0j − 0.3
xi = 40 and xj = 80 ∀ pˆ0j − 0.3 ≤ pˆ0i < pˆ0j
xi = xj = 60 ∀ pˆ 0i = pˆ 0j
(10)
The reverse holds for pˆ0i ≥ pˆ0j . This allocation scheme is optimal if p0i and p0j are
reported truthfully.19
In order to account for the problem of multiple Nash equilibria in a proﬁt sharing
scheme we introduced an ex ante information asymmetry of ∆ = 0.1 in these treat-
19Note that if p 0i = p
0
j an allocation of 80/40 yields the same ﬁrm proﬁt.
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ments. Thus, for the participants’ potential reports we had pˆ0i ∈ {1.4, 1.5, ..., 2.1} in
the Groves treatments and pˆ0i ∈ {1.3, 1.4, ..., 2.2} in the proﬁt sharing treatments.
The compensation in the proﬁt sharing treatments was given by
Pi = 0.1 · [πi(x̂i) + πj(x̂j)] (11)
where Pi represents the points collected in every round. Points were converted into
Euros after the experiment and 7 points corresponded to 1 Euro. According to (11),
compensation in these treatments simply equaled 10% of the actual ﬁrm proﬁt. From
this and the information asymmetry of ∆ = 0.1 it directly follows that there are always
three pareto eﬃcient pure strategy Nash equilibria: δi = δj = 0, δi = δj = 0.1 and
δi = δj = −0.1. The example in Table 1 with p0i = 1.8 and p0j = 1.7 further shows that
additional equilibria emerge in the communication treatment if both players truthfully
communicate their actual productivities during the communication phase. In this
case, not only reporting strategies with δi = δj and |δi| = |δj| ≤ 0.1 form equilibria
for the two players but all pairs of reported productivities which do not aﬀect optimal
resource allocation. For example, in Table 1 this is the case for pˆ0i = 2.2 and pˆ
0
j = 2.1,
i.e. δi = δj = 0.4, and pˆ
0
i = 1.4 and pˆ
0
j = 1.3, i.e. δi = δj = −0.4. Moreover, due
to the discrete model structure of the experiment every pair of reported productivity
parameters where δi = δj but the optimal resource allocation is left unchanged also
represents an equilibrium. E.g. this is the case for pˆ0i = 2.0 and pˆ
0
j = 1.7.
20
In the Groves treatments with and without communication the managers’ compen-
sation in every round was given by:
Pi = 0.1 · [πi(x̂i) + π̂j(x̂j)] (12)
Thus, in every round the manager earned 10% of his division’s actual proﬁt πi(x̂i) and
the other division’s reported proﬁt π̂j(x̂j). In contrast, in the Groves treatment with
communication and audits the managers’ compensation amounted to:
Pi =
{
0 with audit and pˆ0i = p0i
0.1 · [πi(x̂i) + π̂j(x̂j)] else (13)
Thus, whenever a participant was audited and his reported productivity parameter
did not correspond to his actual parameter of the current round he lost all points of
this round. This was to reﬂect the consequences of a negative internal audit in reality.
For the participant’s partner there were no consequences from the audit unless he
20We will come back to these cases in the analysis of the experimental results.
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was audited himself and a deviation from truth telling was detected. In every round
2 of the 20 participants of a session were audited. The audit was independent of
previous audits, the reported productivity parameter and the partner’s audit. Thus,
in every round there was a 10%-probability of being audited. This was all known to
the participants.
As shown in section 2, truthful reporting is the dominant strategy in the Groves
mechanism. Table 2 illustrates this for the case p0i = 1.8 and displays the compensation
of manager i for diﬀerent (pˆ0i , pˆ
0
j)-pairs. It can be seen that the vector of truthful reports
dominates all other vectors. If we also assume p0j = 1.8, the table further illustrates
the players’ prisoners’ dilemma. If they could make binding agreements and agree to
report pˆ0i = pˆ
0
j = 2.1 they could realize a compensation of 10.2 points compared to 8.4
points for truth telling. However, given the partner’s overstatement every manager has
an incentive to report truthfully which would further increase the compensation to 10.8
points. At a ﬁrst glance the combination of pˆ0i = 1.8 and pˆ
0
j = 2.1 seems to represent
a (pareto superior) Nash equilibrium compared to truth telling as manager j realizes
a compensation of 8.4 independent of whether he reports pˆ0j = 2.1 or pˆ
0
j = 1.8 but
manager i realizes an increased compensation. However, due to the uncertainty about
the other player’s actual productivity parameter manager j can only expect pˆ0i = p
0
i
but not pˆ0i = 1.8. Consequently, truthful reporting behavior is the dominant strategy
equilibrium in the Groves mechanism.
Though, as we mentioned above, the Groves treatment with communication and
audits was performed after we had obtained the results from the two other Groves
treatments and was motivated by these results. From an experimental point of view
the positive auditing probability particularly served the purpose to exclude some ex-
planations for potential collusion strategies of the participants. First, as was just
described, players may be indiﬀerent between truth telling and overstatements of their
productivities in the treatments without audits for some given (p0i , p
0
j)-pairs. Due to
the positive auditing probability this is no longer the case. For every parameter con-
stellation and every given report of the partner, truth telling strictly dominates any
other reporting behavior (in terms of a larger E(Pi) ∀ p0j , pˆ0j). That means that in
the treatment with audits there is an even stronger incentive for the participants to
deviate from agreements with their partner. Second, the positive auditing probability
unambiguously draws the participants’ attention to truth telling as a desirable report-
ing strategy (from an individual and from headquarters’ perspective). Thus, deviations
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from truth telling due to incomplete understanding are less likely in this treatment.
However, even with audits, it would have been beneﬁcial for risk neutral participants
to make binding agreements about overstatements of the productivity parameter if
this had been possible. For example, reporting always pˆ0i = pˆ
0
j = 2.1 yields an ex ante
expected compensation (in points) of 9.9 per round in the treatment without audits and
of 9.06 in the treatment with audits compared to an ex ante expected value of 8.45 for
truth telling. However, as in reality, it was not possible for the participants to conclude
binding agreements in the experiment. Furthermore, we excluded the possibility of side
payments between the players.21
From the preceding analysis we can derive the following hypotheses22:
Groves mechanism
Hypothesis 1a: The Groves mechanism induces truthful reporting behavior.
However, as Kunz and Pfeiﬀer (1999) have shown, if there is a positive probability of
tit-for-tat players among the participants rational cooperation can emerge in the Groves
mechanism, similar to the cooperation usually observed in public good experiments.23
Yet, this cooperation declines during the game. Thus, we can state the alternative
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1b: Deviations from truth telling in the Groves mechanism will decrease
in the course of the experiment and will tend to 0.
Similarly, as Hypothesis 1a is very strong and deviations are likely to occur we also
formulate two weaker hypotheses describing the eﬀects of the audits on experimental
outcome if there are deviations from truth telling in the treatments without audits.
Hypothesis 2: Adding a positive auditing probability to the Groves treatment with
communication (i) reduces average misrepresentation and (ii) increases the frequency
of truthful reports.
21Note that analytical studies analyzing coalitions in the Groves mechanism explicitly rely on the
assumption of enforceability of the reporting strategies and side payments agreed upon in the coalition,
see Green and Laﬀont (1979) and Cre´mer (1996). However, as the experimental results will show,
binding contracts and side payments are not necessary to induce collusion under this incentive scheme.
22Due to their importance for the evaluation of the two incentive schemes the hypotheses on head-
quarters’ net earnings will be formulated separately. They will all be analyzed in section 4.3.
23See e.g. Ledyard (1995) for an overview of these experiments.
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Hypothesis 3: Adding a positive auditing probability to the Groves treatment with
communication increases headquarters’ net earnings.
Profit Sharing
Unless one of the multiple equilibria of the proﬁt sharing scheme is “focal” for the
participants we can state the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 4: The possibility of preplay communication in the proﬁt sharing scheme
(i) increases the number of coordinated reports to headquarters but (ii) decreases the
frequency of truthful reports.
Hypothesis 5: The possibility of preplay communication in the proﬁt sharing scheme
increases headquarters’ net earnings.
Groves mechanism vs profit sharing
Hypothesis 6: Truthful reports occur more frequently in the Groves mechanism than
in (i) the proﬁt sharing treatment without communication and (ii) the proﬁt sharing
treatment with communication.
Hypothesis 7: Headquarters’ net earnings in the Groves mechanism are (i) larger
than under the proﬁt sharing scheme without communication and (ii) as large as under
the proﬁt sharing scheme with communication.
The participants of the experiment took over the role of the division managers, whereas
the role of headquarters was played by a computer. The instructions informed the
participants about the proﬁt functions of their divisions according to (9), the resource
allocation according to (10) and their compensation according to (11), (12) or (13).24
At the end of the instructions and before the training started, the participants received
a summary of all functions. In the communication treatments, the participants further
received communication rules. The instructions appeared on computer screens and
24However, the players were never told that the resource allocation scheme according to (10) repre-
sents the optimal allocation given truthful reporting.
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were simultaneously read aloud.25
In the communication treatments the participants were given the possibility to com-
municate with their partner after they had learned their actual productivity parameters
for the current round but before they had to report their parameters. Communication
was possible via a chat program and partners remained completely anonymous to each
other during the whole experiment.26 Thus, both with respect to communication pos-
sibilities in corporate reality and with respect to forms of communication implemented
in other experimental studies – often face-to-face interaction – this represents one of
the weakest forms of communication.27 The communication time was 3.5 minutes in
the ﬁrst round and was reduced to 1.5 min in the course of the experiment.
At the beginning of every round the participants were informed about their divi-
sion’s actual productivity parameter for the current round. At the end of every round
they were informed about the resource allocation, the reported productivity of their
partner and their compensation for this round. In the proﬁt sharing treatments they
were also informed about the actual productivity parameter of their partner in the
current period as they could have easily calculated it themselves from their compensa-
tion. In all Groves treatments the actual productivity remained private information of
every player during the whole experiment. To facilitate comparisons between diﬀerent
rounds the participants were also shown the data of all previous rounds.
The experiment was run at the ExECUTe laboratory of the Institute of Management
and Economics of the Clausthal University of Technology (CUT). In total, 198 students
and employees of the CUT participated in the experiment, 38 in the Groves treatment
without communication and 40 in every other treatment. The sessions lasted between
80 and 150 minutes. All participants received a show-up fee of 10 EUR, the additional
variable remuneration was 12.30 EUR on average, with a minimum of 8.20 EUR and
a maximum of 15.14 EUR.28
25Note that we used “neutral” vocabulary in the instructions. The instructions are available from
the authors upon request.
26The players were explicitly forbidden to reveal their identity or to make arrangements beyond
the game in the laboratory. If so, they would have lost their entire variable compensation from the
experiment. In the analysis of the communication no evidence could be found for rule breaking, not
even for any attempt.
27In general, the more direct the contact between the players during the communication the better
is the cooperation. See Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1998), Brosig, Weimann and Ockenfels (2003),
Paese, Schreiber and Taylor (2003) to this point. However, Bochet, Page and Putterman (2003) ﬁnd
that communication in a chat room is nearly as eﬃcient in inducing cooperation in their experiment
as face-to-face interaction.
28The experiment was realized with the software “Toolkit for Economic Experiments with Commu-
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4 Experimental results
4.1 Groves mechanism
Following Waller and Bishop (1990) we use the following measures of misrepresentation
for the subsequent analysis29:
∆abs = p̂
0
i − p0i (14)
∆rel =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
 p0i−p0i
p0i−1.4
for p̂0i < p
0
i
0 for p̂0i = p
0
i
 p0i−p0i
2.1−p0i
for p̂0i > p
0
i
(15)
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of the experimental data for the three Groves
treatments as well as the results of the Mann-Whitney U-tests we conducted.30 Figure
1 displays the average absolute misrepresentation of the three treatments for all rounds.
We will ﬁrst analyze the treatments without audits and come back to the auditing
treatment later. Table 3 shows that neither in the treatment with nor in the treatment
without communication the Groves mechanism induced truthful reporting behavior.
In the treatment without communication only 44.47% of the reports were truthful,
whereas in the communication treatment the frequency of truth telling even declined
to 21.5%. The results of the noncommunication treatment are very close to those of
Waller and Bishop (1990) who ﬁnd 48% truthful reports, 33% overstatements and 19%
understatements in their Groves treatment.
The table further reveals that mean absolute and relative misrepresentations are
positive in both treatments and more than three times larger in the treatment with
communication than in the treatment without. Mann-Whitney U-tests show that the
absolute and relative misrepresentation in both treatments are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from 0 (p ≤ 0.001∗∗∗ in all cases). Thus, in contrast to the standard theoretical
prediction of Hypothesis 1a the Groves mechanism without audits does not lead to
truthful reporting behavior.
As the communication implemented in the experiment is cheap talk in the game-
theoretical sense both treatments should not diﬀer from a theoretical point of view.
nication” (TEEC).
29The relative misrepresentations for the proﬁt sharing treatments are adjusted to account for the
larger misrepresentation potential.
30For the Mann-Whitney U-tests we used individual averages across rounds as unit of observation
in order to avoid problems of statistical dependence. E.g. for the absolute misrepresentation we used
∆
i
abs =
∑10
t=1 ∆
i,t
abs/10. Thus, for every comparison between treatments we had 38 or 40 observations
per treatment, one for each subject. All tests conducted are two-sided.
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However, the results of Table 3 reveal that misrepresentation in the treatment with
communication is signiﬁcantly larger than in the treatment without. Furthermore, the
frequency of truth telling is much smaller in the communication treatment and this dif-
ference is highly signiﬁcant (χ2, p < 0.001∗∗∗). Figure 1 shows that the deviations from
truth telling in the communication treatment are indeed larger than in the noncommu-
nication treatment in all rounds. The ﬁgure also reveals that contrary to the prediction
of Hypothesis 1b a negative time trend does not exist. Linear regressions support this
ﬁnding as they exhibit an insigniﬁcant time coeﬃcient for both misrepresentation mea-
sures in the noncommunication treatment and even a signiﬁcantly positive coeﬃcient
in the communication treatment.
These deviations from truth telling will now be analyzed in more detail. As men-
tioned above, prior experimental studies ﬁnd signiﬁcant deviations from truth telling
in the Groves mechanism but only weak evidence for collusive behavior of the par-
ticipants. Similar to Waller and Bishop (1990), Chow, Hirst and Shields (1994) and
Chow, Hwang and Liao (2000), the evidence for collusive behavior in our noncommu-
nication treatment is not very strong. Pairwise analysis of the reported productivity
parameters reveals that simultaneous overstatements occurred in only 33 of the 190
cases. Moreover, only the behavior of one pair can be unambiguously attributed to
collusive behavior at the expense of headquarters. The simultaneous overstatements
of the other pairs seem to be the outcome of individual strategies and do not occur
systematically.31 Thus, the overstatement observed on average in this treatment is
rather due to incomplete understanding of the Groves mechanism or social preferences
of the participants (like e.g. altruism) than to attempts to build a reputation as coop-
erative player. The fact that incomplete understanding might have been relevant for
the observed behavior receives further support from the analysis of the questionnaires
answered by the participants after the experiment. The ﬁrst question referred to the
optimal strategy given the partner’s report and should control for the participants’ un-
derstanding of the Groves mechanism. In the treatment without communication only
63% answered the question correctly by indicating truthful reporting behavior, in the
communication treatment this fraction even declined to 50%. We will come back to
this below.32
31It is often observed that players overstate high productivities and report low productivities truth-
fully or overstate productivities independent of their partner’s report.
32Likewise, Waller and Bishop (1990) attribute part of their results to diﬃculties in understand-
ing the comparatively complex Groves mechanism. Gu¨th, Schmidtberger and Schwarze (1983) also
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However, our conclusion about the causes of the observable deviations from truth
telling is completely reversed in the communication treatment. Table 4 displays the
analysis of the participants’ communication in this treatment. All but one pair used
the possibility to communicate.33 Panel 1 of the table reveals that during the communi-
cation the overwhelming majority of the participants informed their partner truthfully
about their actual productivity parameter.34 Panel 2 of Table 4 displays the behavior
of the participants after they had agreed upon a reporting strategy that deviated from
truth telling. It shows that over 95% of the agreements were met and that even in the
last rounds the number of broken agreements did not increase.
As truth telling is the dominant strategy anyway, we did not include agreements to
truthful reporting into the table. However, this also excludes cases where participants
that were continuously cooperating could not overstate their productivity parameter
as it was equal to 2.1. The number of these cases is particularly large (6 and 5) in
rounds 8 and 10 and thus explains the relatively low number of agreements in these
rounds. Table 4 therefore conﬁrms the observation from Figure 1 that there is no end-
game eﬀect in this experiment. In the overwhelming number of cases the cooperation
between the participants does not break down in the last rounds and we observe stable
collusion strategies in the Groves treatment with communication.
So far however, the question remains whether the increase in cooperation in the
communication treatment can be attributed to a fundamental change in the partici-
pants’ reporting behavior or whether it is only due to the fact that in this treatment
more participants were convinced that overstatement would be individually optimal
for them. As we mentioned above, the latter possibility receives some support from
the fact that the number of players that correctly answered the question about their
individually optimal strategy (given the partner’s report) is smaller in the treatment
with communication than in the treatment without. Therefore, Table 5 analyzes the
misrepresentation measures contingent on the participants’ answer to this question.
The ﬁrst column shows that in the treatment without communication both mis-
representation measures are larger when overstatements are considered to be individ-
ﬁnd incomplete understanding of the Vickrey auction which works in a similar way as the Groves
mechanism.
33However, three pairs could not agree during the whole game on the player that should reveal his
information ﬁrst.
34Similarly, Schwartz and Young (2002) analyze cheap talk in a budgeting context and ﬁnd that
for repeated interactions between two participants the productivities were truthfully communicated
to the partners in over 80% of the cases even if they could not be veriﬁed ex post.
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ually optimal than for truthful reporting behavior. They even become negative for
participants that believed understatement was optimal for them. The diﬀerences are
signiﬁcant (Mann-Whitney U, p < 0.05∗∗ in all but one case and p = 0.068∗ in this
case). Thus, in the treatment without communication participants’ reporting behavior
diﬀered signiﬁcantly contingent on what they considered to be individually optimal.
The second column of Table 5 shows that although average misrepresentation in the
communication treatment is still largest for overstatement as the individually optimal
strategy and lowest for understatement, the diﬀerences are a lot smaller. Moreover,
Mann-Whitney U-tests reveal that neither diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at conventional levels
(p > 0.4 in all cases). We interpret this as evidence for fundamental diﬀerences be-
tween the participants’ reporting behavior in the treatments with and without preplay
communication. While in the treatment without communication participants’ reports
diﬀered according to what they considered as individually optimal, the participants in
the communication treatment chose reporting strategies that were beneﬁcial for both
partners, irrespective of their considerations about the individually optimal strategy.
These results are quite surprising, particularly with respect to the stability of the
participants’ collusion strategies. Thus, we implemented the Groves treatment with
communication and audits in order to further analyze this collusion. As we have
described above, this treatment should strongly decrease the probability that the results
of the communication treatment are mainly driven by incomplete understanding of the
Groves mechanism or weak incentives to deviate from agreements with the partner.
Figure 1 shows that average absolute misrepresentation in the treatment with com-
munication and audits remains positive in every round. Although average misrepresen-
tation in this treatment declines to a level slightly above the level in the noncommuni-
cation treatment, deviations from truth telling remain signiﬁcant in this treatment, too
(Mann-Whitney U, p < 0.001∗∗∗). Thus, Hypothesis 1a deﬁnitely has to be rejected.
Moreover, there is still no negative time trend in the misrepresentation and this is con-
ﬁrmed by the regressions we ran. Consequently, we also have to reject Hypothesis 1b.
However, Table 3 conﬁrms the predictions of Hypothesis 2: First, the introduction of
the positive auditing probability signiﬁcantly reduces both ∆abs and ∆rel. Second, the
frequency of truth telling is signiﬁcantly larger in the treatment with communication
and audits than in the two other Groves treatments (χ2, p < 0.001∗∗∗ in both cases).
Although Table 3 shows that the absolute misrepresentation measures in the treat-
ment without communication and the treatment with communication and audits diﬀer
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only marginally and that the relative misrepresentation measures are insigniﬁcantly dif-
ferent, misrepresentations in these two treatments diﬀer strongly with respect to their
structure. While deviations from truth telling in the noncommunication treatment
can be traced back to incomplete understanding and social preferences, the auditing
treatment leads to either coordinated truth telling or coordinated misrepresentations.
This is conﬁrmed by Panel 3 of Table 4. Again, we only display agreements upon
reporting strategies that deviated from truth telling. The number of these agreements
varies strongly in the course of the experiment. However, again more than 94% of the
agreements are met. The number of agreements does not decrease very strongly in the
last rounds and the overwhelming majority of the players sticks to their agreements.35
Moreover, only three pairs agreed to report their parameters truthfully in (nearly) all
rounds. The agreements of all other pairs varied between truth telling and misrepre-
sentations. This conﬁrms the ﬁnding from Figure 1 that there is no end-game eﬀect in
this treatment, either. Furthermore, it shows that the ﬁndings from the communication
treatment without audits are quite robust. Although the positive auditing probability
decreases the frequency of deviations from truth telling and therefore average misrep-
resentation, we still observe stable collusion strategies of the participants. Thus, the
results of all Groves treatments diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the theoretical predictions.
4.2 Profit sharing
Table 6 displays the descriptive statistics for the proﬁt sharing treatments and the
results of the Mann-Whitney U-tests we conducted. The table shows that both mis-
representation measures in the two treatments do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly. Figure 2
displays how ∆abs evolved in the proﬁt sharing treatments during the experiment. It
can be seen that ∆abs is always positive in the treatment without communication and
positive in all but one round in the treatment with communication and that it remains
quite stable in both treatments during the experiment.
Mann-Whitney U-tests reveal that the deviations from truth telling are signiﬁ-
cant both in the noncommunication treatment (p < 0.05∗∗ for both misrepresentation
measures) and in the communication treatment (p < 0.01∗∗∗ for the absolute misrepre-
sentation measure). Yet, as we explained in section 2, the eﬃciency of a proﬁt sharing
35Note that the pair causing both deviations in round 9 reaches an agreement on nontruthful
reporting behavior in round 10 and both players stick to the agreement.
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scheme does not depend on the frequency of truthful reports but on the participants’
coordination on an equilibrium that yields optimal resource allocation. Therefore, Ta-
ble 7 shows the average number of equilibrium “hits” (i.e. the play of equilibrium
strategies ex post) per round in both treatment.
Panel 1 of Table 7 reveals that coordination occurred in only 30% of the cases in
the noncommunication treatment. It further shows that the truth telling equilibrium
is hit more often than the two other equilibria δi = δj = 0.1 and δi = δj = −0.1.36
Truthful reporting behavior thus seems to represent a focal point for the participants.
However, it is not strong enough to coordinate all reports.
It is surprising that the average number of equilibrium hits in rounds 6-10 was as
large as in rounds 1-5. Obviously, repeated interaction does not improve coordination
in the proﬁt sharing treatment without communication. At a ﬁrst glance, this seems
to indicate that the results are essentially driven by incomplete understanding. How-
ever, this is contradicted by two other ﬁndings: First, in addition to the coordinated
reports there were on average 18.8 reported productivity parameters (i.e. 47% of all
reports) in every round with |δi| ≤ 0.1. Thus, these reports could have led to an equi-
librium but did not due to the partner’s diﬀering report. Second, the two questions
of the questionnaire that should control for participants’ understanding were correctly
answered by 77.5% and 80% of the participants.37 Together, these ﬁndings support
the explanation that the results are mainly caused by coordination problems rather
than by incomplete understanding. The losses in eﬃciency due to these coordination
failures will be analyzed in section 4.3.
Panel 2 of Table 7 shows that consistent with the predictions of part (i) of Hy-
pothesis 4 the possibility of preplay communication strongly increased coordination.
The fraction of reports with δi = δj more than doubled to 63%. The analysis of the
communication shows that participants informed their partner about their actual pro-
ductivity parameters in 91% of the cases and that this information was truthful in over
98% of the cases. However, equilibria with δi = δj = 0 were chosen less frequently
(with respect to all cases with δi = δj) than in the noncommunication treatment. Only
in the last round one of these equilibria with δi = δj = 0.6 explains part of the ob-
36There were also 3 cases in the noncommunication treatment where δi = δj > 0.1 or δi = δj < −0.1.
However, we did not include them into Table 7 as deviations from truth telling with absolute values
larger than 0.1 do not lead to an equilibrium with certainty (i.e. for all p0i ) in the noncommunication
treatment. In the communication treatment however, the corresponding cases are included into Table
7 if participants agreed upon these reports during the communication, see section 3.
37Note that 15% of the participants answered both questions incorrectly.
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servable magnitude of ∆abs in Figure 2. Thus, truth telling obviously serves as a focal
point during the communication. This already contradicts part (ii) of Hypothesis 4
which predicts a decrease in the frequency of truth telling. Moreover, if we consider
all reported productivities we also ﬁnd that the overall frequency of truthful reports is
signiﬁcantly larger in the treatment with communication than in the treatment without
(χ2, p < 0.001∗∗∗). Thus, part (ii) of Hypothesis 4 has to be rejected.
Yet, it was shown in section 3 that due to the discrete model structure δi = δj is not
a necessary condition for an equilibrium in the communication treatment as long as the
reported productivity parameters induce eﬃcient resource allocation. Pairs of reported
productivities with δi = δj but eﬃcient resource allocation occurred on average 2.4
times per round (12%). Moreover, when analyzing the communication we found strong
evidence that participants were indeed aware of the fact that only resource allocation
inﬂuenced their compensation but not the exact magnitude of the deviations from
truth telling.38 Thus, in 75% of the cases in the communication treatment the reporting
strategies represented pareto eﬃcient equilibrium play which is signiﬁcantly larger than
the corresponding 30% in the noncommunication treatment (χ2, p < 0.001∗∗∗). This is
consistent with the predictions of part (i) of Hypothesis 4.39
The following section will compare the implications of the results obtained so far
for the comparison between the Groves mechanism and the proﬁt sharing scheme.
4.3 Profit sharing vs Groves
First, we will compare the deviations from truth telling. As the maximum over- and
understatement in the proﬁt sharing treatment were always 0.1 larger than in the
Groves treatments we will only present the comparison of the relative misrepresentation
measures.40 Table 8 shows that ∆rel is signiﬁcantly larger in all Groves treatments than
in both proﬁt sharing treatments. This already points at a potential disadvantage of
the Groves mechanism from headquarters’ perspective. However, the relevant measure
for the comparison between the two incentive schemes is not deviation from truth
38For example, after two participants had truthfully exchanged their actual productivity parameters
of p0i = 1.6 and p
0
j = 1.7 and player j had proposed to report pˆ
0
i = 1.6 and pˆ
0
j = 1.9, player i noted
(translated from German): “As long as you report a larger productivity you get more resource units.
Thus, we can report 1.6:1.7 or 1.6:1.9, that makes no diﬀerence.”
39Note that if we only consider the cases where δi = δj we obtain the same level of signiﬁcance.
40If we use ∆abs instead of ∆rel the diﬀerences in Table 8 remain signiﬁcant except for the compar-
isons with the Groves treatment without communication.
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telling but headquarters’ net earnings.
To measure the quality of the incentive schemes we calculate their eﬃciency losses
by subtracting headquarters’ actual earnings (net of compensation costs) from head-
quarters’ net earnings in case of truth telling.41 The eﬃciency loss in the Groves
treatment with communication and audits considers that participants did not receive
any compensation in case they were audited and a deviation from truth telling was
revealed but does not include any costs for these audits. Table 9 displays the mean
and median eﬃciency losses per round and pair for the diﬀerent treatments as well as
the corresponding Mann-Whitney U-tests.42
The table shows that the eﬃciency loss is lowest in the proﬁt sharing treatment with
communication and largest in the Groves treatment with communication. Consistent
with Hypothesis 3 the introduction of audits signiﬁcantly decreases the eﬃciency loss
of the Groves treatment with communication. However, the eﬃciency loss in the treat-
ment with audits is only insigniﬁcantly smaller than in the Groves treatment without
communication. Moreover, recall that the former eﬃciency loss does not include any
auditing costs.
When the Groves mechanism is compared to the proﬁt sharing scheme both parts of
Hypothesis 7 have to be rejected: (i) None of the Groves treatments has a signiﬁcantly
lower eﬃciency loss than the proﬁt sharing treatment without communication and (ii)
the eﬃciency loss in the proﬁt sharing treatment with communication is signiﬁcantly
lower than in all Groves treatments. Moreover, while the eﬃciency losses in both
Groves treatments with communication are larger in the last ﬁve rounds than in the
ﬁrst ﬁve rounds, the reverse holds in the proﬁt sharing treatments. This indicates
improved coordination in the proﬁt sharing case and further conﬁrms participants’
stable collusion strategies in the two Groves treatments.
Finally, a comparison of the two proﬁt sharing treatments shows that communica-
tion not only improves participants’ coordination but also increases headquarters’ net
earnings (Hypothesis 5).
Therefore, from headquarters’ perspective – and in contrast to the theoretical pre-
41We did not directly compare headquarters’ actual earnings in the diﬀerent treatments as due to
the randomization of the productivity parameters headquarters’ net earnings for truth telling were
somewhat larger in the proﬁt sharing treatments than in the Groves treatments. Thus, using actual
net earnings would favor proﬁt sharing even if the eﬃciency losses under Groves and proﬁt sharing
were equal.
42Note that the number of observations is now reduced to 19 and 20 per treatment, one for each
pair.
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dictions – proﬁt sharing is superior compared to the Groves mechanism in our ex-
perimental study. With respect to truth telling, statistical analyses show that the
frequency of truth telling is signiﬁcantly larger in the Groves treatment with audits
than in the proﬁt sharing treatment without communication but signiﬁcantly lower
than in the proﬁt sharing treatment with communication. This is consistent with the
prediction of part (i) of Hypothesis 6 but contradicts part (ii). Thus, even if truth
telling has some value for headquarters beyond optimal resource allocation, the Groves
mechanism would not be preferred to the proﬁt sharing scheme in our model structure.
5 Conclusion
This paper experimentally explores the eﬃciency of the Groves mechanism and a proﬁt
sharing scheme in a corporate budgeting context. Furthermore, it examines the eﬀects
of anonymous communication on both incentive schemes. This establishes a stronger
link to corporate reality with its various communication possibilities.
Our results show that although truth telling is the dominant strategy equilibrium
in the Groves mechanism we do not ﬁnd truthful reporting behavior of the participants
in our experiment. In the Groves treatment without communication these deviations
can be attributed to incomplete understanding and social preferences but there is only
weak evidence for collusive behavior. This changes fundamentally in the communica-
tion treatment. Although preplay communication is anonymous and represents cheap
talk, it leads to stable collusion strategies of the participants and overstatements of the
productivity parameters. The introduction of a positive auditing probability decreases
average misrepresentation and increases the frequency of truth telling. However, it can-
not break up the participants’ stable collusion strategies and leads to either coordinated
truth telling or coordinated misrepresentation of productivities.
In the proﬁt sharing treatments, truth telling is a Nash equilibrium for the par-
ticipants. However, this equilibrium is not unique. According to this, we observe
coordination failures and ineﬃcient resource allocation in the treatment without com-
munication. As predicted from the theoretical analysis, the communication possibility
strongly increases equilibrium play by the participants.
To compare the eﬃciency of the two incentive mechanisms we examined headquar-
ters’ earnings (net of compensation costs) and found that they are larger in the proﬁt
sharing treatments than in all Groves treatments. Thus, although the Groves mech-
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anism is superior from a theoretical perspective, the proﬁt sharing scheme turns out
to be advantageous in our experimental setting. This is essentially due to the eﬀects
of the communication possibility on both incentive schemes. In the proﬁt sharing
treatments cheap talk is theoretically relevant and – consistent with the theoretical
predictions – improves coordination in the experiment. This is beneﬁcial for both the
division managers and headquarters as it helps to avoid ineﬃcient resource allocation
due to coordination failures. Accordingly, headquarters’ net earnings in the proﬁt
sharing treatment with communication are signiﬁcantly larger than in all other treat-
ments. In contrast, cheap talk does not matter from a theoretical perspective in the
Groves treatments but, as the experiment has shown, is relevant when implemented
in the experiment as it improves cooperation between division managers. Yet, this
cooperation is detrimental for headquarters as it leads to overstated productivities and
thus increases compensation costs. In the experiment, headquarters’ net earnings in
the Groves treatment with communication are signiﬁcantly smaller than in any other
treatment.
We argue that with respect to corporate reality with its various communication
possibilities our results contribute to explain why the Groves mechanism is not observed
as an incentive scheme in budgeting processes in reality. While this incentive scheme
is collusion proof from a theoretical perspective, our experimental analysis has shown
that it is not when implemented in practice.
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Figure 1: Mean absolute misrepresentation in the Groves treatments.
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Figure 2: Mean absolute misrepresentation in the proﬁt sharing treatments.
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p̂0j
1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.2
1.3 7.8 7.6 7.6 7.6 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8
1.4 8.0 7.8 7.6 7.6 7.6 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8
1.5 8.0 8.0 7.8 7.6 7.6 7.6 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8
1.6 8.0 8.0 8.0 7.8 7.6 7.6 7.6 6.8 6.8 6.8
p̂0i 1.7 7.6 8.0 8.0 8.0 7.8 7.6 7.6 7.6 6.8 6.8
1.8 7.6 7.6 8.0 8.0 8.0 7.8 7.6 7.6 7.6 6.8
1.9 7.6 7.6 7.6 8.0 8.0 8.0 7.8 7.6 7.6 7.6
2.0 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 8.0 8.0 8.0 7.8 7.6 7.6
2.1 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 8.0 8.0 8.0 7.8 7.6
2.2 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 8.0 8.0 8.0 7.8
Table 1: Compensation of managers i and j under proﬁt sharing for diﬀerent pairs of
reported productivities if p0i = 1.8 and p
0
j = 1.7.
p̂0j
1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.1
1.4 6.0 6.0 6.8 7.6 7.8 8.8 9.8 10.8
1.5 6.8 6.6 6.8 7.6 8.4 8.8 9.8 10.8
1.6 6.8 7.2 7.2 7.6 8.4 9.2 9.8 10.8
p̂0i 1.7 6.8 7.2 7.6 7.8 8.4 9.2 10.0 10.8
1.8 7.0 7.2 7.6 8.0 8.4 9.2 10.0 10.8
1.9 7.0 7.2 7.6 8.0 8.4 9.0 10.0 10.8
2.0 7.0 7.2 7.4 8.0 8.4 8.8 9.6 10.8
2.1 7.0 7.2 7.4 7.6 8.4 8.8 9.2 10.2
Table 2: Compensation of manager i under the Groves mechanism for diﬀerent pairs
of reported productivities if p0i = 1.8.
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Panel 1: Number of reports
without with with comm.
communication communication and audits
Understatements 72 23 21
(18.95%) (5.75%) (5.25%)
Truthful reports 169 86 257
(44.47%) (21.50%) (64.25%)
Overstatements 139 291 122
(36.58%) (72.75%) (30.50%)
Total 380 400 400
(100%) (100%) (100%)
Panel 2: Mean absolute misrepresentation (∆abs)
Rounds 1-5 0.0547 0.1945 0.0780
Rounds 6-10 0.0605 0.2350 0.0980
Total 0.0576 0.2148 0.0880
without/with with/audits without/audits
Signiﬁcance p < 0.001∗∗∗ p < 0.001∗∗∗ p = 0.065∗
Panel 3: Mean relative misrepresentation (∆rel)
Rounds 1-5 0.1604 0.4643 0.1910
Rounds 6-10 0.1683 0.6057 0.2152
Total 0.1644 0.5350 0.2031
without/with with/audits without/audits
Signiﬁcance p < 0.001∗∗∗ p < 0.001∗∗∗ p = 0.660
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the Groves treatments. Mann-Whitney U-tests, unit
of observation: individual averages across rounds. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ signiﬁes signiﬁcance at
the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-level.
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without with
communication communication
Overstatement ∆abs 0.1700 0.2250
∆rel 0.4180 0.5787
Truthful report ∆abs 0.0667 0.2210
∆rel 0.2050 0.5324
Understatement ∆abs −0.0289 0.1700
∆rel −0.0848 0.4416
Table 5: Mean absolute and relative misrepresentation in the Groves treatments with
and without communication contingent on the answer to the following question of the
questionnaire: “If you only played once with your partner and you already knew his
decision, it would always be beneﬁcial for you to (a) report a productivity higher than
your actual productivity, (b) report your actual productivity, (c) report a productivity
lower than your actual productivity.”
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Panel 1: Number of reports
without with
communication communication
Understatements 77 32
(19.25%) (8.00%)
Truthful reports 195 293
(48.75%) (73.25%)
Overstatements 128 75
(32.00%) (18.75%)
Total 400 400
(100%) (100%)
Panel 2: Mean absolute misrepresentation (∆abs)
Rounds 1-5 0.0310 0.0315
Rounds 6-10 0.0365 0.0335
Total 0.0338 0.0325
without/with
Signiﬁcance p = 0.348
Panel 3: Mean relative misrepresentation (∆rel)
Rounds 1-5 0.0619 0.0374
Rounds 6-10 0.0924 0.0834
Total 0.0772 0.0604
without/with
Signiﬁcance p = 0.934
Table 6: Descriptive statistics of the proﬁt sharing treatments. Mann-Whitney U-tests,
unit of observation: individual averages across rounds. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ signiﬁes signiﬁcance
at the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-level.
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Panel 1: Proﬁt sharing without communication
Equilibria with Equilibria with
δi = δj = 0 δi = δj = ±0.1
Rounds 1-5 5.2 0.8
(26%) (4%)
Rounds 6-10 4.8 1.2
(24%) (6%)
Total 5 1
(25%) (5%)
Panel 2: Proﬁt sharing with communication
Equilibria with Equilibria with
δi = δj = 0 δi = δj = 0
Rounds 1-5 11.2 0.8
(56%) (4%)
Rounds 6-10 12.2 1
(61%) (5%)
Total 11.7 0.9
(58.5%) (4.5%)
Table 7: Ex post equilibrium play in both proﬁt sharing treatments: Average number
of pairs per round hitting an equilibrium.
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Proﬁt sharing Proﬁt sharing
without comm. with comm.
∆rel = 0.0722 ∆rel = 0.0602
Groves without comm. ∆rel = 0.1643 p = 0.090
∗ p = 0.043∗∗
Groves with comm. ∆rel = 0.5350 p < 0.001
∗∗∗ p < 0.001∗∗∗
Groves with comm. and audits ∆rel = 0.2031 p = 0.002
∗∗∗ p < 0.001∗∗∗
Table 8: Mean relative misrepresentation in all treatments. Mann-Whitney U-tests,
unit of observation: individual averages across rounds. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ signiﬁes signiﬁcance
at the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-level.
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